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At the 2000 World Radio Conference (WRC), a European initiative resulted in the 
approval of resolutions 605 and 606 (agenda item 1.15), which the United States 
opposed. These resolutions established provisional power flux density (PFD) limits on 
the L2 and L5 frequencies of the Global Positioning System. These limits will negatively 
affect the $1.2B GPS modernization. 
The United States will have to present its positions and rationale regarding the 
PFD limits to international meetings, including the 2003 World Radio Conference, to 
persuade the international community to adopt the U.S. view. Developing the U.S. view 
and conducting the supporting technical work for the World Radio Conference is 
accomplished through a domestic interagency U.S. process called the International 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (ITAC) process. In this process, the interests 
and efforts of numerous agencies must be coordinated to produce a focused and cohesive 
argument. Accomplishing this is not easy. In fact, several players in the ITAC process 
working issues surrounding WRC resolutions 605 and 606 have encountered considerable 
difficulty reaching agreement and submitting technical contributions internationally. 
An analysis of the ITAC process using coordination theory reveals that the 
problem stems from coequal participants attempting to coordinate directly conflicting 
interests in a consensus-based process. The problem is further complicated by the 
geographic separation of the parties. Several remedial actions are available, including 
using a third-party to arbitrate directly conflicting issues and co-locating the parties. 
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SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT AND THE GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM: A 
CASE STUDY IN INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
I.      Introduction 
Background 
At the 2000 World Radio Conference (WRC), a European initiative resulted in the 
approval of resolutions 605 and 606 (agenda item 1.15), which the United States opposed 
(Schoettler, 2000: 48, 49). These resolutions established the need to consider power flux 
density (PFD) limits on the L2 and L5 frequencies of the Global Positioning System 
(Delegation Report, 2000: 48, 50), as well as future Radio Navigation Satellite Systems 
(RNSS). GPS satellites transmit navigation data to the GPS receivers on the L2 and L5 
bands. The resolutions passed at WRC-2000 place provisional limits on the power of the 
satellite transmissions. The limits are based upon the theory that GPS Satellite 
transmissions can interfere with Radars and Distance Measuring Equipments (DME's), 
which have been allocated in the L2 and L5 bands prior to radio navigation satellite 
systems (RNSS). 
These limits will directly affect the $1.2B GPS modernization and are undesirable 
to the United States for several reasons. U.S. forces depend upon GPS technology, and 
the successful jamming of current and weaker GPS signals would be harmful to U.S. 
operations, and could place U.S. troops at risk. The PFD limits restrict the power of GPS 
signals, and therefore increase the system's susceptibility to jamming and inadvertent 
interference. Once international rules on power restrictions become permanent, changes 
to these rules will require international agreement. If the restrictions could not be lifted, 
the system's development would be constrained. 
The Global Positioning System Joint Program office has taken action to protect 
the GPS spectrum. These actions, including conducting technical studies, simulations, 
and tests, provide the technical and engineering arguments that ensure unnecessary 
restrictions are not imposed (Department of the Air Force WRC-03 Plan). The U.S. 
position for Resolution 605 is a coordination method whereby the RNSS operators will 
coordinate to provide protection to incumbent systems and retain the flexibility to 
modernize and build future RNSS systems. The U.S. position for Resolution 606 is that 
no PFD limit is needed (U.S. Preliminary View). The results of the technical studies and 
tests are presented internationally in ITU forums and other venues to support the U.S. 
position. In order to submit papers internationally, they must be domestically 
coordinated and approved through an interagency government process. 
"The activities of the ITU [(International Telecommunications Union)], including 
the [World Radio Conferences], offer the United States an important opportunity to 
advance its views on technical standards and regulations" (U.S. Congress, Office of 
Technology Assessment, 1991: 14). It is at these ITU meetings and the World Radio 
Conference that the United States will have to present its arguments and persuade the 
international community to adopt the U.S. view. 
Developing the U.S. view and supporting technical work is accomplished through 
a domestic interagency U.S. process called the International Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee (ITAC) process. The interests and efforts of numerous agencies 
must be coordinated to produce a focused and cohesive argument. Accomplishing this is 
not easy. 
Establishing and maintaining a successful interagency coordination program is 
extremely difficult (Rogers, 1982: 5). Individuals attempting to orchestrate inter- 
organizational coordination face problems ranging from communication to fragmentation 
of authority (Rogers, 1982: 66). The ITAC process and preparations for the 2003 World 
Radio Conference is no different. Producing a focused and cohesive supported position 
on GPS from the diverse interests in the United States has been and continues to be 
challenging. 
Problem Statement 
The Global Positioning System Joint Program Office has been having difficulty 
gaining domestic approval to submit the results of technical analyses performed related to 
WRC resolutions 605 and 606 internationally. This difficulty stems from the apparent 
divergent perspectives and interests within the U.S. government interacting within the 
International Telecommunication Advisory Committee Process (ITAC). 
This technical, bureaucratic, and political conflict risks delaying or weakening 
defense of U.S. spectrum in the international arena. Bureaucratic conflict in which the 
solution is the product of an interagency power struggle and not based solely on the 
overriding national interest can cause significant harm to U.S. interests in the Global 
Positioning System Program. The U.S. government must act with a consistent voice to 
protect its interests abroad, and in doing so form and support its positions with a unified 
objective in mind. 
Research Question 
This study examined the domestic spectrum management process surrounding 
World Radio Conference resolutions 605 and 606. This study analyzed the International 
Telecommunication Advisory Process, with an emphasis on the approval process for 
technical contributions. This study identified problem areas, and recommended 
alternatives to improve the process. Improving this domestic process will help the U.S. 
more effectively defend its interests internationally. 
Methodology 
The methodology was a single-case study design (Yin, 1984) analyzing GPS 
spectrum management pertaining to WRC resolutions 605 and 606 issues. The spectrum 
management process involves many agencies and organizations throughout the U.S. 
government. This process provides an opportunity to assess a specific example of 
interagency coordination, and help the Global Positioning System Program in the 
process. The process will be analyzed using coordination theory. 
Thesis Organization 
This thesis is organized in five chapters. Each chapter covers a different focus on 
the topic. Readers only interested in the analysis and results should focus on chapters 
four and five. The theory and method are described in chapters two and three. 
II.      Literature Review 
Coordination Theory 
Coordination theory provides a framework for analyzing the management of 
interdependencies between organizations. Coordination theory is a basis upon which 
coordination failures can be identified and alternative approaches generated. In this 
instance, coordination theory will be used to analyze how the GPS Joint Program Office 
(JPO), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and other Federal Government 
agencies coordinate WRC 605 and 606 issues in the International Telecommunication 
Advisory Committee Process (ITAC). This chapter will formally define coordination, 
provide a methodology for assessing coordination failures, coordinating mechanisms, 
task dependencies, and identify alternative coordination mechanisms to produce a more 
effective system in coordinating U.S. government actions in the international 
telecommunications arena. 
Coordination Defined 
According to Crowston, "[in] coordination theory, actors in organizations face 
coordination problems that arise from dependencies that constrain how tasks can be 
performed" (Crowston, 1997: 159). The interests and positions of the various U.S. 
government agencies create dependencies between actions taken by various agencies in 
the formation of U.S. spectrum positions. The agency representatives must coordinate 
the positions across the many agencies with the goal of protecting U.S. interests as 
effectively as possible. 
Several types of dependencies occur in spectrum management. One dependency 
that frequently occurs in spectrum management is a task-resource dependency, which is 
based on the shared use, by two or more agencies of the same bandwidth. In this 
example, the task is whatever the frequency is desired for, such as communicating, and 
the resource is the free bandwidth. One agency's actions in the bandwidth may constrain 
the other agency's ability to use the bandwidth by causing interference, and as a result the 
use must be coordinated. Continuing from this fundamental example, U.S. positions and 
technical contributions submitted abroad can have impact on international regulations 
that affect the use of spectrum, such as defining what constitutes "interference". As a 
result of this influence on international regulations, dependencies arise from these 
internationally submitted documents—a shared output dependency (listed under "task- 
task" in table 1). This means that a document or position that one agency desires to 
submit internationally is constrained by the interests of other agencies, and must be 
coordinated because all the agencies will be bound by the international regulations these 
documents and positions influence. 
Coordination is defined as "simultaneously managing a flow of ongoing activities 
and a set of interrelated decisions" (Rathnam et. ah, 1995: 1903), or as "managing 
dependencies between activities" (Malone and Crowston, 1994: 90). These and other 
academic definitions share the emphasis on the managing of dependencies between 
activities in the furtherance of a common goal or objective (the common goal of U.S. 
agencies is the furtherance of the national interest). Using Crowston's terminology, 
"actors in organizations face coordination problems that arise from dependencies that 
constrain how tasks can be performed," and to overcome these coordination problems, 
actors perform additional activities called coordination mechanisms (Crowston, 1997). 
An example of a coordination mechanism is a working group where conflicting positions 
are resolved, or a method for prioritizing interests. An example of a coordination 
problem would be one agency failing to account for the negative effects of a proposed 
regulation on another agency, perhaps resulting in a sub-optimal U.S. position. 
Rathnam et. ah, Mahajan, and Whinston (1995) describe coordination problems 
as coordination gaps. They define a coordination gap in the context of customer support 
as "the breakdowns in the work and information flows that take place within the team 
during the enactment of the customer support interaction process, due to either the lack of 
information, the presence of incorrect information, or the excess of unusable 
information" (Rathnam et. ah, 1995: 1903). They describe the customer support process 
as "a business task that involves diverse team members often working together across 
organizational, departmental, hierarchical, and geographic boundaries" (Rathnam et. al., 
1995: 1900); this description is relevant to a diversity of applications; in this instance, the 
members of different government agencies who must work together to form a unified 
position. The government agencies come together to form groups with members that are 
geographically dispersed, and in different organizations, and as such is similar to 
Rathnam's customer support team. 
The Purpose of Coordination Theory 
The goal of coordination theory is simple: to define processes and improve 
performance, with a focus on the efficient and effective management of dependencies 
(Crowston, 1997). The theory enumerates two main premises that guide analysis and 
reorganization under a coordination theory framework: the dependencies and 
mechanisms for managing them are general and common across many organizational 
settings; and, different mechanisms may be used to manage the same dependencies. 
Therefore, in redesigning a process, coordination problems may be identified and 
processes redesigned to correct these deficiencies (Crowston, 1997). 
Identifying Coordination Mechanisms 
Three main methods for identifying coordination mechanisms are: looking for 
activities that appear to be coordinating mechanisms, looking for dependencies between 
activities that require some coordination mechanism, and looking for coordination 
problems that suggest missing coordination mechanisms (Osborn, 1993 in Crowston, 
1997). In the first step, looking for coordination mechanisms themselves, we can 
"examine the activities in the current process [and] identify those that seem to be part of 
some coordination mechanism, then determine what dependencies they manage" 
(Crowston, 1997: 163). Coordination mechanisms may take a variety of forms, including 
meetings, organizational rules, and working groups, or review processes. A working 
group, acting as a coordination mechanism, may be the forum where a resource is 
allocated to one use or another. 
When looking for dependencies, we "list the activities and resources involved in 
the process, consider what dependencies are possible between them, and then determine 
how these dependencies are being managed" (Crowston, 1997: 163). Finally, for looking 
for coordination problems, we "can look for problems with the process that hint at 
unmanaged coordination problems and identify the underlying dependencies" (Crowston, 
1997: 163). Several categories of dependencies and coordinating mechanisms are 
summarized in a table below (Crowston, 1997: 160): 
Table 1: 
Dependency 
Coordination Mechanisms (Crowston, 1997) 
Coordination Mechanism to Manage Dependency 
Task-Task dependency 
Tasks share common output 
Same characteristics Look for duplicate tasks 
Merge tasks or pick one to do 
Overlapping Negotiate a mutually agreeable result 
Conflicting Pick one task to do 
Tasks share common input 
(shared resource) 
Shareable resource No conflict 
Reusable resource Notice Conflict 
Schedule use of the resource 
Nonreusable resource Pick one task to do 
Output of task is input of other (prerequisite) 
Same characteristics Order tasks 
Ensure usability of output 
Manage transfer of resources 
Conflicting -Reorder tasks to avoid conflict 
-Add another task to repair conflict 
Task-resource 
Resource required by task Identify necessary resources 
Identify available resources 
Choose a particular set of resources 
Assign the resource 
Resource-Resource 
One resource depends on another Identify the dependency 
Manage the dependency 
Resources are anything used by or created by tasks. Tasks include the goals and 
activities of the process. The electromagnetic spectrum fits in the above table as a 
reusable resource—one individual's use of the spectrum may preclude another individual 
from using the same band (due to interference), but the resource exists unchanged after 
the use ceases. As the table above states, when conflict exists in the use of a resource, the 
conflict must be recognized and then the resource use should be scheduled. Accordingly, 
one method used to coordinate spectrum use is to schedule or allocate frequencies to one 
use or another. One example of spectrum allocation is the Federal Communications 
Commission's use of licenses for television and radio stations. However, there may be 
factors other than the coordination mechanism type contributing to coordination 
difficulty. Rathnam et. al (1995) provide four variables that can aid in assessing these 
other factors. 
Variables Affecting Coordination Mechanisms 
Rathnam et. al (1995) define four independent variables that describe the 
characteristics of the coordination (problem resolution) process. These variables aid in 
analyzing the cause of a coordination gap (coordination failure), and provide a 
framework identifying factors affecting coordination other than the dependencies and 
type of mechanism used. The four independent variables Rathnam et al (1995) defined as 
describing the characteristics of the problem resolution process are: interconnectedness, 
input uncertainty, interaction distances, and role conflicts (Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1901). 
The different variables are defined as follows: interconnectedness is "the nature and 
extent of the one-to-many mapping between tasks and roles" (Rathnam et. al, 1995: 
1903), input uncertainty is "the organization's incomplete information about what, where, 
when, and how the customer input is going to be processed to produce desired outcomes" 
(Larsson and Bowen 1989: qtd in Rathnam et. al, 1995:1903), interaction distances is 
"for a given task, the amount of communication effort required to accomplish 
coordination" (Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1903), and role conflicts are "the nature and extent 
of the differences between the requirements of the tasks of the customer support team and 
the nature of the incentive system" (Rathnam 1995: 1904). Role conflicts represent an 
inconsistency between the job of an employee and their job performance evaluation, and 
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do not seem especially applicable in this setting. Role ambiguity (Baker and O'Brien 
1971; Ahmed and Young 1974; qtd. in Rogers, 1982: 66; Griffin 1999) is a good 
substitute for role conflicts in this setting and represents a more general uncertainty about 
what priorities to put first when faced with multiple relationships. Role ambiguity 
represents the uncertainty about the different interests an actor represents. The inter- 
organizational and inter-agency context faces many of the same problems measured by 
Rathnam (1995), and therefore Rathnam's criteria are useful in the spectrum management 
setting as well. Inter-agency or inter-organizational coordination faces problems 
including communication (Torrens 1969; Gardner and Snipe 1970; Hooyman, 1976; qtd. 
in Rogers, 1982: 65), role ambiguity (Baker and O'Brien 1971; Ahmed and Young 1974; 
qtd. in Rogers, 1982: 66), interaction distance (Rogers, 1982: 66), and fragmentation of 
authority (Rogers, 1982: 66). 
Analytical Framework and Method 
By combining the work of Crowston (1997) and Rathnam et. al. (1995), a multi- 
step approach for analyzing coordination mechanisms emerges. Whereas Crowston 
(1997) and Crowston and Osborn (1998) applied the theory within a single organization, 
in this instance the theory will be applied between organizations from one perspective, or 
within a single organization—the Executive branch of the Federal Government—from 
another perspective. The application of the theory does not change, as the typologies do 
not change just because the organizational boundaries are re-defined. However, as the 
organizational boundaries are expanded, the tasks and activities will become more 
complex because the higher-level tasks will be the summation of many lower-level tasks. 
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The first step is to identify and analyze the coordination mechanism using one of 
the following approaches, where the approach is selected based upon the situation and 
information available: look for the coordinating mechanisms, look for dependencies, or 
look for coordination problems (Osborn, 1993). The second step is to look for 
unmanaged dependencies and other factors affecting coordination. The third step is to 
consider the coordination mechanisms, dependencies, and other factors affecting 
coordination, and identify options for improvement. While the factors that affect 
coordination may be defined in different ways, Rathnam et. al (1995) provides four 
categories: interconnectedness, input uncertainty, interaction distances, and role conflicts. 
After the dependencies, mechanisms used (or in some cases absent), and other 
characteristics are identified, the process can be redesigned to correct the problem. 
Data collection for this type of analysis has been accomplished in several 
manners, the most prominent of which include: case studies (Crowston, 1997; Crowston, 
1991) and statistical sampling and surveys (Rathnam et. al, 1995; Van de Ven, 1976; 
Roger and Whetten, 1982). Within the case study paradigm, three ways to collect 
information are "1) interviewing individuals, 2) examining documents that describe 
standard operating procedures, and 3) observing individuals" (March & Simon 1958, qtd. 
in Crowston 1997, 162). 
Generating Alternative Coordination Mechanisms 
Behavioralist vs. Structuralist Schools 
According to Howard E. McCurdy (McCurdy, 1983), the macro view of 
coordination can be categorized into two main schools of thought, the structure and 
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behavior schools. The structure school emphasizes the use of organization charts, 
defined duties and responsibilities, systems of authority, bureaucracy, and other formal 
mechanisms. The behavior school emphasizes individuals, teamwork, and individual 
cooperation. For the structuralists, "Authority.. .was the source of all coordination," 
(McCurdy, 1983: 119) while for the behavioralists, "the job of the executive is not to 
stand at the intersections of the organization and shout orders, but to orchestrate the flow 
of traffic" (McCurdy, 1983: 127). This fundamental paradigm difference shapes the 
options available for coordination, and places additional constraints on the process. 
While the two approaches differ, they compliment each other when used together. 
According to Lawler (1989), "with high interdependence [between activities], the 
choice is between work teams and individual approaches to work design with extensive 
hierarchy. In most cases, work teams are the best alternative because they are more cost 
effective. Low interdependence favors maximizing individual performance..." (1989: 
13). Therefore, a less bureaucratic approach may be more effective in managing 
activities with higher interdependence. 
Using the above definitions coordinating mechanisms may be categorized as 
behavioral or structural. These different ways of coordinating have different costs and 
advantages. The following chart summarizes, at a macro level, the trade-off between 
programming (bureaucratic methods) and informal, personal interaction (behavioral 
methods). 
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Table 2: Summary of McCurdy (1983) and Lawler (1989) 
Interdependence Coordination Approach Associated Management 
Perspective 
High Behavioral - Less Bureaucratic Facilitate communication and 
teamwork 
Low Structure / Programming - More 
Bureaucratic 
Define rules, responsibilities, and 
authority 
Assessing Other Factors that Affect Coordination 
In addition to analyzing the task dependencies and coordination mechanisms, 
other factors can affect the ability to coordinate, such as distances between offices, and 
the complexity of the issues to be coordinated. The variables provided by Rathnam et. al. 
(1995) above provide a good framework for identifying and analyzing these other factors. 
Specifically, Rathnam et. al. (1995) discovered several attributes that make coordination 
more difficult. Increases in these attributes can be associated with increased difficulty 
coordinating. These attributes are interconnectedness, input uncertainty, interaction 
distances, and role conflicts or role ambiguity. 
After identifying an aspect that contributes to one of these categories, the process 
could be redesigned to reduce the effect. For example, if large interaction distances 
(effort required to coordinate) are evident in a process, information technology could be 
used to facilitate communication through an on-line database. The interaction distance 
might manifest itself as repeated telephone calls required to gain access to needed 
information. Furthermore, Table 2: above could be applied; if the interconnectedness is 
low, the structured approach that dictates where official information must reside (the 
database), is appropriate. However, if interconnectedness is high, a database plus co- 
location of the actors in the same office may be appropriate. It is difficult to specify at a 
greater level of detail, as the corrective action will be situation-specific. Rathnam et. al. 
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(1995) provide several information technology initiatives that were shown to mitigate 
coordination problems in their survey of customer support teams (Rathnam et. al, 1995). 
To mitigate input uncertainty, representation and reasoning about the interaction process, 
interaction locking (simultaneous access to information, and propagation of work 
performed on shared objects to the team), and process support (pre-defined work and 
information flows) (Rathnam et. al, 1995) should be used. To mitigate interaction 
distances, multi-user interfaces, interaction locking, and process support should be used 
(Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1907). Rathnam et. al(1995) proposed a solution concerning 
interaction distances, however did not find conclusive supporting evidence for the 
efficacy of the solution (Rathnam et. al, 1995: 1916). 
Legislation 
Federal Law establishes broad coordination requirements upon certain 
government agencies involved with the Global Positioning System. This body of federal 
law requires that the executive branch, usually by imposing a duty upon a department's 
secretary, include certain considerations when planning, designing, and operating the 
system. The primary law affecting the Global Positioning System is Title 10, Section 
2281 of the United States Code. Various other acts, mainly appropriations and 
authorizations acts, place additional obligations on the program. 
Title 10, section 2281 imposes several requirements to encourage interagency 
coordination. The congressionally mandated Federal Radionavigation Plan recognizes 
the need to coordinate across agencies. Congress requires this plan to be "prepared 
jointly by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation" (10 USC 2281). 
15 
Further coordination is required with the Department of Transportation on any 
augmentations that achieve or enhance GPS transportation uses. The Secretary of 
Defense must also coordinate with "the Secretary of Commerce.. .and other appropriate 
trade officials to facilitate the development of new and expanded civil and commercial 
uses for the GPS" (10 USC 2281). These broad guidelines show several of the 
interdependencies between agencies regarding the Global Positioning System. 
The Federal Radionavigation Plan "serves as the planning and policy document 
for all present and future Federally provided common-use Radionavigation systems" 
(Department of Defense and Department of Transportation, 2000: 1-1). Several 
Memorandums of Agreement (Mo As) between the Departments of Defense and 
Transportation, and the Interagency GPS Executive board (IGEB) influence the 
production of the Radionavigation plan. The IGEB is a formalized high-level policy and 
planning organization that encompasses numerous governmental agencies. The 
memorandums recognize, on behalf of the two departments, the need to coordinate 
navigation planning and utilize common systems wherever possible (Department of 
Defense and Department of Transportation, 2000: 1-1). A Presidential Decision 
Directive created the Interagency GPS Executive board. It is the permanent interagency 
forum designed to manage GPS and U.S. Government augmentation to GPS. 
Specific to spectrum management, public law 105-303 (Oct 28, 1998) states that 
the president should "provide clear direction and adequate resources" so the Department 
of Commerce can "achieve and sustain efficient management of the electromagnetic 
spectrum used by the Global Positioning System; and protect that spectrum from 
disruption and interference" on an international basis. This law also directs other broad 
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coordination between the DoD designers, planners, and operators with the Department of 
Commerce. 
An executive order, Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-6, established the 
Interagency GPS Executive Board (Department of Defense and Department of 
Transportation, 1997). The departments of Agriculture, Transportation, Defense, 
Commerce, Interior, Justice, NASA, and State participate through the IGEB in 
management and use of the system. 
17 
III.      Methodology 
Overview 
This research used a case study method structured by coordination theory to guide 
the analysis and data collection. The subject of the study was spectrum management with 
a focus on the Global Positioning System and World Radio Conference resolutions 605 & 
606. The primary sources of data were interviews with members of the Global 
Positioning System Joint Program Office (JPO) located in El Segundo California, Federal 
civil agencies located in the Washington D.C. area, and corroborating documentation, 
when available. Finally, the analysis of the data was conducted using the theory 
framework described in this chapter and chapter two. 
Case Study Methodology 
The methodology was a single-case study design analyzing the spectrum 
management process. The spectrum management process involves many agencies and 
organizations throughout the U.S. government. This process provides an opportunity to 
assess a specific example of interagency coordination. Furthermore, this assessment 
would help improve the interagency processes involved in Global Positioning System 
spectrum management. 
Case studies can be used to accomplish various goals: "to provide description 
(Kidder, 1982), test theory (Pinfield, 1986; Anderson 1983), or generate theory (e.g., 
Gersick 1988; Harris & Sutton, 1986)" (qtd. in Eisenhardt, 1989: 535). This case study 
falls in two categories, to provide description and to generate theory. In the first instance, 
this case study will provide a description of the interagency spectrum management 
process, as it applies to the Global Positioning System. Secondly, this case will use 
coordination theory to assess how well the process is functioning. Additionally, the 
method used to assess the process offers a roadmap for the examination and improvement 
of other interagency processes. 
Limiting the Scope of the Research 
When examining the Global Positioning System Program, many interagency 
processes could be examined. This study was limited to one interagency process—the 
GPS spectrum management actions related to the 2000 World Radio Conference (WRC) 
resolutions 605 & 606. This agency-spanning process was identified and chosen based 
upon three criteria: importance, dysfunction, and feasibility (Hammer, 2001: 127). The 
criteria serve two purposes: to ensure that the process will illustrate the difficulties 
inherent in interagency coordination, and to select a process that would benefit 
significantly through the application of coordination theory. The GPS spectrum 
management actions related to resolutions 605 & 606 were chosen because of their high 
importance, the high feasibility of examining them, and the apparent dysfunction of the 
process. Furthermore, it is not the purpose of this study to assess the correctness of any 
agency's decision in a particular instance. Instead, the study intends to identify problems 




The data was collected through eleven interviews and supporting documentation. 
The interviews were conducted over several months, through multiple site visits to the 
various organizations, telephone calls and electronic mail. Generally, the individuals 
interviewed were personally involved in the process. The documents were collected to 
support the interviews. When an item of interest was identified in an interview, 
documentation was sought both to confirm what was stated in the interview and to 
provide additional information. 
All data sources have the potential for error. Interview data faces several 
problems including bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation (Yin, 1984). 
When pertaining to established facts, confirming documents mitigate this source of error 
(e-mails, memorandums, official documents). When confirming documents are not 
available, multiple interview sources are used (Yin, 1984). Documentary sources may 
face similar problems concerning inaccuracy or bias (Yin, 1984). This source of error is 
mitigated when the document is corroborated, states an official position, is published by 
an official body, or is subject to a review process. However, combining these sources 
gives greater credibility. As Eisenhardt (1989) states, "[t]he triangulation made possible 
by multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). 
Data collection was accomplished in two steps. In the first step, the objective was 
to identify interagency processes. To accomplish this, many individuals were 
interviewed to solicit general information about the interagency processes. The 
appendices contain the interview guide that was used during the unstructured interviews. 
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The first stage interviews were only used to identify processes that could be investigated, 
and not for analysis (appendix B). Once this preliminary information was collected, one 
process was selected using the criteria of importance, feasibility, and dysfunction (as 
described above). After this first round of interviews, the spectrum management process 
was identified and chosen for analysis. Appendix C lists some of the other identified 
processes, some of which may be suitable for future research. The second stage of data 
collection focused on spectrum management. In-depth information particular to spectrum 
management was gathered from multiple sources and perspectives, including interviews 
from representatives of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Joint Program Office 
(JPO), National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Air Force 
Frequency Management Agency (AFFMA), Interagency GPS Executive Board (IGEB) 
Secretariat, and a non-government spectrum management consultant. From this 
information, the process was mapped, dependencies revealed, and problems examined. 
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Data Analysis 
The data was analyzed using coordination theory as described in the literature 
review (Chapter II). Coordination theory provides the framework for looking at 
interagency coordination. The basic steps include (adapted from and using: Crowston 
1997; Crowston and Osborn 1998; Crowston 1991; Malone and Crowston, 1994; 
Rathnamer. al, 1995): 
1) Identify the Coordination Mechanisms 
Identify the dependencies 
Verify the model of dependencies and/or coordination mechanisms 
2) Look for unmanaged dependencies and identify other factors affecting 
coordination 
3) Identify problems and options for improvement 
Identify the Coordination Mechanisms 
In the spectrum management process, the coordination mechanisms are easily 
identified, and as a result, the process is well suited to an analysis that focuses on the 
coordination activities, such as working groups, study groups, and approval processes 
(Crowston and Osborn, 1998: 23, Crowston, 1997: 163). This type of analysis is called 
an activity-focused analysis (Crowston and Osborn, 1998: 23, Crowston, 1997: 163). In 
this type of analysis, the focus is to "identify coordination mechanisms, then search for 
dependencies.. .identify activities in the process that appear to be coordination activities, 
then ask what dependencies those activities manage" (Crowston and Osborn, 1998:23). 
In the case of GPS Spectrum Management, the analysis would begin with the 
coordination mechanisms, which are the various committees, and proceed to see what 
dependencies those activities manage. 
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It is critical that the model of mechanisms and dependencies be correct. To assess 
the validity of the model, experts in the field will review the model and multiple sources 
of information will be used (Yin, 1984: 36). 
Look for unmanaged dependencies and identify other factors affecting 
coordination 
An unmanaged dependency is one where a dependent relationship exists, yet there 
is no mechanism to coordinate it (Crowston, 1997: 168). Unmanaged dependencies can 
be identified by looking for coordination problems (Crowston, 1997: 168). An example 
of such a problem would be the lack of a process to manage the constituents' needs (such 
as a review board), or a mechanism that does not match the type of dependency to be 
managed (the review board does not have adequate authority). 
Identifying other factors affecting coordination involves looking at outside factors 
such as the distance between the parties or complexity of the task. It may be useful to 
assess these other factors using Rathnam's (1995) variables. This may be useful because 
the fundamental conditions of interagency coordination (see Rogers, 1982) are similar to 
those in Rathnam's study (see Rathnam et. ah, 1995). 
Identify Problems and Options for Improvement 
The first two steps used to analyze data should reveal problems within 
interagency coordination and areas for improvement. The exact nature of the 
improvement initiatives should suit the particular situation and problem. Care should be 
taken to ensure that all dependencies are addressed, and that any intervening factors (such 
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as distance) are addressed. For example, if the intervening factor is distance, then the 
solution should address the need to be located closer together. 
Validity Threats 
Four main types of validity threats affect the credibility of this study. These 
include threats to construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and reliability 
(Dooley, 2001). While validity threats are difficult to assess in qualitative research 
(Dooley, 2001), several techniques do exist to address these concerns. The table below 
summarizes the validity threats (Yin, 1984) and the method used to mitigate the validity 
threat. 
Table 3: Validity Threats 
Validity Threat Applicability Mitigation Technique 
Construct Validity Correct identification of coordination mechanisms 
and dependencies. 
Use multiple sources of 
data to confirm or 
disaffirm; 
Establish a chain of 
evidence; 
Have key informants 
review draft report 
Internal Validity Correct analysis of coordination modes and 
problems. 
Application of coordination 
theory framework 
(explanation-building) 
External Validity Generalizability of findings to other GPS program 
interagency processes. 
Identify common traits 
between processes (out of 
scope); 
Use Replication (out of 
scope) 
Ability to generalize to other interagency 
programs. 
Identify elements common 
to interagency programs 
(out of scope) 
Reliability Data collection methods Document method and 
processes; 
Use protocol 
Analysis Document analysis 




Construct validity is defined as the extent to which the measure reflects the 
intended construct (Dooley, 2001: 342) or establishing correct operational measures for 
the concepts being studied (Yin, 1984: 36). Several techniques were used including 
multiple sources of evidence, establishing a chain of evidence, and having key informants 
review the findings to ensure the correct assessment of dependencies, actors, and 
processes. 
Internal Validity 
Internal validity is defined as "truthfulness of the assertion that the observed 
effect is due to the independent variables in the study" (Dooley, 2001: 346), or 
"establishing a causal relationship...as distinguished from spurious relationship" (Yin, 
1984: 36). Coordination theory, as defined and described in chapter 2, helps ensure 
internal validity. The conclusions rest upon the careful application of the logic developed 
by the experts in the fields. In turn, confidence in the logic developed by the experts 
combined with the correct application, lends credibility to the results. 
External Validity 
External validity is defined as "generalizability of the study's findings to other 
populations, places, or times" (Dooley, 2001: 345) or "establishing the domain to which a 
study's findings can be generalized" (Yin, 1984: 36). The best way to assess external 
validity is by "repeating the study with different subjects, in different situations and 
places, and at later times," (Dooley, 2001: 272) which is outside the scope of this study. 
Another method to assess external validity is through analytical generalization, which 
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focuses on the similarities between situations, and how well the theory applies to other 
situations (Yin, 1984: 39). This study has several tenets similar to other interagency 
circumstances, which will be addressed in chapter five. 
Reliability 
Reliability concerns ensuring that the operations of the study can be repeated with 
the same results (Yin, 1984: 36). The documented process and references should aid in 
replication of this study by allowing future researchers to validate and use the same 
model. Furthermore, the study should be repeatable by other researchers using the same 
analytical framework and theory. 
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IV.      Data Collection And Analysis 
Introduction 
As stated in the methodology (Chapter III), coordination problems may reveal 
unmanaged dependencies (Crowston, 1997: 168). This approach, where the analysis 
begins at the "problem" proves very useful in this instance. The individuals working 
issues related to WRC resolutions 605 and 606 in the interagency process have 
experienced great difficulty coordinating technical contributions, and to a lesser degree 
proposals / views, with other agencies (Interview with FAA Spectrum Manager; 
Interview with JPO Spectrum Manager; Interview with Spectrum Consultant). 
Unfortunately, simply knowing that difficulty exists does not illustrate where the 
root problem or cause of the difficulty is—it merely indicates that something may be 
wrong. These difficulties in the interagency process provide an excellent starting point 
from which to begin the analysis. Crowston states we "can look for problems with the 
process that hint at unmanaged coordination problems and identify the underlying 
dependencies" (Crowston, 1997: 163). Following this approach, the analysis first looks 
at the point in the process where the difficulties illustrate a potential problem. 
Subsequently, coordination theory guides the analysis through the process searching for 
the cause of the difficulty. 
To begin the analysis, it is first important to understand the context and the 
interagency structure within which these issues are coordinated. A detailed explanation 
of the World Radio Conference preparatory process is provided below, focusing on those 
areas pertinent to the problem introduced above. Following the explanation of the 
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process, the coordination analysis proceeds in an attempt to ascertain the cause of the 
difficulty and identify ways to improve the process. Furthermore, as stated in chapter III, 
this study looks for ways to improve the process and not assess the decisions of any 
particular agency or individual. 
The U.S. Domestic World Radio Conference Preparatory Process 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
World Radiocommunication Conferences (WRCs) 
A 












Chair: Asst Sec of 
Commerce 
=> IRAC 
|Federal Dept / Agencies | 
FCC:   Federal Communications Commission 
NTIA: National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
IRAC: Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (20 Agencies) 
Figure 1: Domestic Spectrum Management Process (adapted from U.S. Gov. Slide) 
As shown above, the electromagnetic spectrum is managed in two separate 
structures: The National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) 
manages the spectrum for Federal agencies, and the Federal Communications 
Commission manages the spectrum for all other users (NTIA Spectrum Manual, 2001). 
The Department of State acts as the U.S. representative to international spectrum 
regulatory bodies and treaty organizations, such as the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU). On matters that require international participation, the process participants 
28 
advise the State Department under a structure called the International Telecommunication 
Advisory Committee (ITAC) and U.S. delegations. Through this structure U.S. positions 
are created and supporting technical work, studies, and proposals are approved and 
submitted internationally. 
For government users, the spectrum management process usually begins in 
individual government agencies or their departments. Spectrum management actions 
may be necessary in response to spectrum management developments or new program 
needs. Issues may be international, domestic, or both, involving policy and technical 
questions. The domestic issues are primarily handled by the NTIA, FCC, or both, 
depending on the nature of the issue. International issues are handled through ITAC. 
The International Telecommunications Advisory Committee Process 
U.S. preparations for the World Radio Conferences consist of two different types 
of products (Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager, Spectrum Management 
Consultant). The first type of product is a policy document, which is called either a 
preliminary view, draft proposal, or proposal, depending on which stage in the process 
the document is drafted. The preliminary view is an early position while a proposal is a 
more mature position on any given issue. The second type of document is a technical 
document. These technical documents, also called contributions, are submitted to ITU 
working parties and other international bodies. These submissions should provide the 
specific scientific, technical, and regulatory support for the existing positions or view, 
and are submitted to preparatory meetings at regular intervals in the time between 
conferences. Hence, one of the goals of this work process is to form the technical basis 
29 
internationally for the U.S. position on a given issue. The figure below shows the process 














As indicated in figure one, the Department of State handles the U.S. participation 
in international telecommunications treaty organizations, such as the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU). The International Telecommunication Advisory 
Committee process (ITAC) advises the Department of State in this role, and includes all 
of the committees, subcommittees, and groups in figure 2 whose output feeds into the 
Department of State (the FCC and NTIA are not themselves committees, but agencies 
that host committees). "ITAC aids in the preparation of U.S. positions for meetings of 
international treaty organizations, develops and coordinates proposed contributions to 
international meetings and submits them to the Department of State for consideration" 
(ITAC, 2001). Members of ITAC include "representatives of government and operating 
agencies, as well as scientific or industrial organizations involved in the 
telecommunications sector" (ITAC, 2001).   The ITAC process is divided into several 
areas, including radiocommunication (ITAC-R), telecommunications (ITAC-T), and 
telecommunication development (ITAC-D). GPS spectrum issues fall under the 
radiocommunication sector, or ITAC-R (ITAC, 2001). 
For ITAC-R, U.S. positions are formed in the committees as indicated in figure 2. 
Policy submissions enter the process on the left, into their respective federal (NTIA) or 
civil (FCC) process. The FCC and NTIA proposals are merged to form official U.S. 
proposals (Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager). Contributions (technical papers) 
proceed through the working parties on the right side of figure 2. The ITAC-R technical 
approval process is sub-divided into study groups and working parties according to areas 
of responsibility. Within the ITAC-R technical approval process, Study Group 8 has 
responsibility for mobile, radiodetermination (radar), and related satellite services. The 
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study groups are groupings of the working parties and do not play an independent role. 
U.S. Working Party 8D is a sub-unit of Study Group 8, and has responsibility for the 
Radionavigation Satellite Service (RNSS). U.S. Working Party 8B, also a sub-unit of 
SG8, has responsibility for radiolocation and radiodetermination issues. The Global 
Positioning System is a Radionavigation Satellite Service (RNSS). Accordingly, most 
GPS World Radio Conference issues are worked through U.S. Study Group 8, U.S. 
Working Party 8D (Radionavigation Satellite Service), and to a lesser degree U.S. 
Working Party 8B (Radiolocation). Any interested party may join the U.S. Working 
Parties (Interview with JPO Spectrum Engineer). 
The ITAC-R National Committee is the approval body for all technical 
contributions submitted internationally to the ITU, regional spectrum bodies, and 
preparatory meetings held by the ITU. The Department of State chairs the IT AC 
National Committee in consultation with the Vice Chairs, NTIA & FCC. The committee 
chair, in consultation with the vice-chairs, has final approval authority. Although the 
National Committee considers both unapproved and approved items, the committee will 
generally only approve items approved by the Working Parties. The Working Parties 
approve items on a consensus basis of interested government and industry participants 
(Interview with GPS Spectrum Engineer; Interview With FAA Spectrum Engineer, 2001; 
International Telecommunications Advisory Committee). 
In the case of GPS, most technical actions and resulting contributions originate in 
the Joint Program Office (Interview with JPO Spectrum Manager, Interview with FAA 
Spectrum Manager, Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager). These actions include 
studies, analyses, simulations, tests, and proposed regulatory mechanisms. These actions 
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are documented, and the documentation must be approved through the technical approval 
process of the U.S. International Telecommunication Advisory Committee (for 
Radiocommunications) Process (ITAC-R) before being submitted internationally to the 
ITU. 
Selected Process Participants 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations (ITU History Online), of which the United States is a 
member. The Union exists to promote telecommunications standards and resolve 
telecommunications issues worldwide. The ITU holds World Radiocommunication 
Conferences (WRCs), which are treaty conferences that require formal proposals and 
delegations under the U.S. Department of State. These conferences are "the means by 
which the world distributes the resources of the radio-frequency spectrum" (U.S. 
Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991: 9). The final acts of WRCs have 
international treaty status, and as such are generally adhered to by all 190 ITU member 
countries (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991: 9-10). The ITU also 
holds numerous preparatory meetings where WRC participants discuss issues and 
formulate positions (Interview with JPO Spectrum Engineer). These meetings occur at 
regular intervals leading up to the WRCs (JPO Briefing, Interview with JPO Spectrum 
Engineer). Technical papers and proposals are presented and discussed at these meetings, 
laying the foundation for eventual WRC negotiations (Interview with JPO Spectrum 
Engineer). 
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The United States must be able to forcefully advocate and support its positions on 
radio-frequency spectrum in the international arena. "The lack of a unified radio- 
communication policy, including international spectrum goals, will hurt the United 
States' ability to negotiate and compete globally" (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1991: 3). The technical contributions that support the policy (and are a type 
of narrow policy statement in themselves) require the same unity and cohesiveness to 
achieve maximum effectiveness. The ITU holds the meetings that are the main 
international forum where global spectrum policy and regulations standards are 
established. 
National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) 
The National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) is "an 
agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC), [and] is the Executive Branch's 
principal voice on domestic and international telecommunications and information 
technology issues" (NTIA, 2001). The NTIA has ultimate authority in managing the 
spectrum for Federal users (Roosa, 1994). Within the NTIA, The Office of Spectrum 
Management (OSM) is responsible for managing the Federal Government's use of the 
radio frequency spectrum (NTIA, 2001). 
The Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC), which the NTIA chairs, 
assists "the Assistant Secretary [of Commerce] in assigning frequencies to U.S. 
Government radio stations and in developing and executing policies, programs, 
procedures, and technical criteria pertaining to the allocation, management, and use of the 
spectrum" (NTIA Web, 2001). 
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IRAC's Radio Conference Subcommittee (RCS) prepares for ITU radio 
conferences, including the development of recommended U.S. Proposals and Positions 
for the WRC. The RCS positions are merged with Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) WRC Advisory Committee (WAC) positions to form a united US position on a 
given agenda item. Both RCS and WAC are in coordination on a regular basis 
throughout the process so the proposals & positions that are developed are usually mostly 
in accord with each other (Interview with JPO Spectrum Engineer 2001; Interview with 
Expert Spectrum Consultant 2002; Interview with NTIA Spectrum Manager 2002). 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent U.S. 
Government Regulatory Agency established by Congress in the Communications Act of 
1934 (FCC Web, 2001). The FCC regulates "domestic and interstate and international 
communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable" (FCC Web, 2001). "The 
FCC's jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions" 
(FCC Web, 2001). The FCC represents non-government users in the spectrum 
management process. The World Radio Conference Advisory Committee (WAC) 
advises the FCC on preparations for the World Radio Conference (FCC WAC WEB 
Documents, 2002). Interim Working Groups (IWGs) deal with specific issues as 
delegated by the WAC (FCC WAC Web Documents, 2002). Private sector participants 
can offer draft proposals through the industry working groups (Interview with spectrum 
consultant). 
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Interagency Global Positioning System Executive Board (IGEB) 
Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) NTSC-6 established the Interagency GPS 
Executive Board (IGEB) as a permanent body to manage GPS policy and U.S. 
Government augmentations to GPS. Of particular importance, the IGEB Charter states 
that part of the Board's function is to "approve management issues that affect dual-use" 
and "resolve interdepartmental issues" for the benefit of GPS (Department of Defense 
and Department of Transportation IGEB Charter; JPO Spectrum Manager). An inter- 
agency working group on spectrum issues, IGEB-WG 3, has been established under the 
IGEB body.   IGEB Working Group 3 is "focused on the protection of spectrum used by 
the Global Positioning System (GPS) and its augmentations" (Department of Defense and 
Department of Transportation IGEB-WG 3 Charter). Members of the IGEB and of 
IGEB-WG 3 include DoD, DoC, DoT, NASA and other agencies (Department of 
Defense and Department of Transportation IGEB Charter; Department of Defense and 
Department of Transportation IGEB-WG 3 Charter). The IGEB and IGEB-WG 3 exist to 
rectify multi-agency GPS issues, however the body does not have any official authority 
and has not been influential in the national spectrum management process. 
Air Force Frequency Management Agency (AFFMA) 
The Air Force Frequency Management Agency (AFFMA) is an agency of the Air 
Force responsible for supporting Air Force frequency management needs. The Agency 
supports a wide range of programs, including space, ground, and airborne systems. The 
Agency is located in the Washington, D.C. area, and is in close contact with other 
frequency management organizations (Interview with AFFMA Manager, Jan 11 2002). 
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
Within the FAA, the Office of Spectrum Policy and Management, known as ASR, 
represents the United States in ITU meetings and in the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) (FAA Web, 2001). ASR also provides the U.S. member to assist 
the ICAO in formulating ICAO positions on various frequency management issues. ASR 
is active in the World Radio Conference preparation process (FAA Web, 2001). 
The Spectrum Planning and International Division of ASR (ASR-200) focuses on 
providing for and protecting the radio frequency spectrum required to support civil 
aviation communications, navigation, and surveillance services. This division has 
responsibility for technical and engineering issues regarding civil aviation functions. In 
accomplishing its responsibilities, ASR-200 is involved in extensive studies and technical 
preparation (FAA Web, 2001). 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an agency of the United 
Nations, was created by international agreement in 1947 (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2001). ICAO's responsibilities include "maintaining co-ordination with 
the International Telecommunication Union [ITU] on all matters concerning the 
electromagnetic spectrum allocated to the aeronautical communications, radio navigation 
and surveillance services and administering the use of these allocations" (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2001). ICAO's recommendations have considerable 
influence on ITU member countries and the aviation community. As a result, ICAO 
plays a role in shaping the international opinion regarding resolutions 605 and 606. 
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Currently, "the ICAO position is to support a single maximum aggregate interference 
limit [PFD limit] for all RNSS systems operating in [L5]" (Capretti and Witzen, 2001: 
29). 
Overview of Domestic Agencies' GPS Roles 
The chart below outlines some of the IT AC members' GPS-related roles as 
defined in the 1999 Federal Radionavigation Plan, Presidential Decision Directive, or 
Public Law. 
Table 4: Agency GPS Responsibilities 
Party Responsibility Reference 
Department of Defense Global Positioning System March 29, 1996 Presidential 
Decision Directive; 1999 
Federal Radionavigation 
Plan, A-2 
Department of Commerce Global Positioning System 
Spectrum and Commercial 
Applications 
Public Law 105-303 
DOT/FAA Civil Application of Global 
Positioning System 
March 29, 1996 Presidential 
Decision Directive; 1999 
Federal Radionavigation 
Plan, A-5 
Manage interference testing 
in the GPS Spectrum to 
prevent disruptions to 
service. 
1999 Federal 
Radionavigation Plan, 3-9 
Department of State Oversight of interagency 
review process 
March 29, 1996 Presidential 
Decision Directive; 1999 
Federal Radionavigation 
Plan, A-10 
World Radio Conference 2003 Resolutions 605 and 606 
At the 2000 World Radio Conference, European efforts resulted in the approval of 
resolutions 605 and 606 (agenda item 1.15), which the United States opposed (Schoettler, 
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2001: 48, 49). These resolutions stated a need to consider power flux density limits on 
the L2 and L5 frequencies of the Global Positioning System (Schoettler, 2001: 48, 50), as 
well as future Radionavigation Satellite Systems (RNSS). GPS satellites transmit 
navigation data to the GPS receivers on the L2 and L5 bands. The limits are based upon 
the theory that GPS Satellite transmissions can interfere with Radars and Distance 
Measuring Equipments (DME's), which have been assignments in the L2 and L5 bands 
respectively. 
The United States Air Force GPS Joint Program Office (JPO) has been 
conducting technical work to either substantiate or refute the theory that GPS 
transmissions will interfere with incumbent systems. In the case of the L2 band, there 
have not been any reports of interference to radars in the 23 years that GPS has been in 
operation. The GPS L5 band will not start transmitting until 2005 and will not be fully 
operational until 2016. 
Such limits would directly affect the $1.2B GPS modernization and are 
undesirable to the United States for several reasons. U.S. forces depend upon GPS 
technology, and the successful jamming of current and weaker GPS signals would be 
harmful to U.S. operations, and could place U.S. troops at risk. A high-powered or 
focused GPS signal is an effective countermeasure to jamming. The PFD limits restrict 
the power of GPS signals, and therefore increase the system's susceptibility to jamming. 
Non-military uses of GPS are also susceptible to malicious or inadvertent interference, 
which a high-powered signal would help overcome. A higher-powered civil signal will 
also maximize the availability of signal at any given point on Earth, thus improving GPS 
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reliability and utility. In fact, the L5 civil signal is designed to be more powerful than the 
current LI civil signal. 
Resolutions 605 and 606 will inhibit the Global Positioning System 
modernization program. Future and unforeseen national security interests or civil 
applications may require more powerful signals. Once international rules on power 
restrictions become permanent, changes to these rules will require international 
agreement. If the restrictions could not be lifted, the system's development would be 
constrained. 
There are several reasons besides the claim of interference why foreign countries 
could desire to place power flux density limits upon the Global Positioning System. 
First, some foreign governments could find themselves in a military confrontation with 
the United States, and lower power levels would make jamming GPS signals easier. 
Secondly, the European Union is developing a rival satellite navigation system called 
Galileo. Placing PFD limits upon the satellite navigation frequencies limits the U.S. 
system, but has no effect on the yet un-fielded European system. The limits would 
inhibit the development of the U.S. system, which might help a rival European system to 
gain acceptance in the future. Otherwise, with unbridled development, the American 
system may so far exceed a European system by the time it is operational, that the 
European system may never gain acceptance. Finally, any adversary of the United States 
might support a restriction that limits the American system, when the country itself does 
not have such a system and is not affected. 
The veracity of these theories is not important to the conclusions of this study; it 
is only important that plausible motivations other than claims of interference exist for 
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limitations on radionavigation satellite transmissions. These other plausible motivations 
increase the need for the United States to present a coherent and persuasive position to 
the international community. 
GPS Spectrum Defense Efforts 
The United States Air Force GPS JPO has taken action to protect the GPS 
spectrum including technical studies, analyses, simulations, tests, developing regulatory 
mechanisms, and conducting outreach efforts to other countries (Department of the Air 
Force WRC-03 Plan). The U.S. proposals for Resolutions 605 and 606 have been 
developed and state the U.S. positions. The U.S. position for Resolution 605 is a 
coordination procedure whereby the RNSS operators will coordinate to provide 
protection to incumbent systems and retain the flexibility to modernize and build future 
RNSS systems. The U.S. position for Resolution 606 is that no PFD limit is needed (U.S. 
Preliminary View). Technical analyses are performed in conjunction with policy 
formulation to ensure that correct policy has been selected, and is demonstrated as fact to 
the international community. As such, the results of the technical studies and tests are 
contributions to the WRC preparatory meetings and ITU, and should support the existing 
U.S. position. In order to submit papers internationally, they must be coordinated and 
approved through the ITAC-R Technical Approval Process. 
Consensus-Based Coordination 
Crowston's typology, as shown in chapter two, states that when activities share a 
common output, and that output is overlapping, a mutually agreeable result should be 
negotiated; when the tasks conflict, one task should be chosen to do (Crowston 1997). 
42 
The various activities performed by the different actors in the technical approval process 
share a common output; in other words, anything that is submitted internationally is 
considered to be submitted by the United States Government, and not any individual 
agency. All of the documents and positions come together (a shared output) in the U.S. 
negotiations at the World Radio Conference. As such, the individual agencies should be 
in concurrence with a document when it goes international. The domestic process is 
organized to ensure that result. All agencies and even private sector participants can 
provide input into the IT AC process, and voice disagreements where appropriate. In the 
technical approval process, the government and industry participants work together in the 
same committees and working groups. In the proposal generating process, the private 
sector interfaces with the FCC and Federal government agencies interface with the NTIA. 
In the IT AC process, the task dependencies are often overlapping, and a mutually 
agreeable result can be negotiated. This means that including one party's concerns does 
not affect or conflict with including those of any other party. An example of such an 
occurrence would be if one agency requires "A" or "B", and another agency requires "B" 
or "C", such that the agencies could negotiate to perform "B"—a mutually agreeable (and 
efficient) result. A consensus-based process works well for this type of situation. 
The second possibility for activities with a shared output is that the tasks will 
conflict. This means that including one party's concerns will affect or conflict with 
including those of any other party. One such example would be if one agency would 
benefit from a regulation and another would be harmed by the same regulation. While 
there may be some middle ground where each agency gets part of their objectives met, 
any solution will involve a trade-off. A consensus-based process, by definition, does not 
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have the ability to make this trade-off decision if the parties will not agree. The 
consensus process is susceptible to negotiation tactics by parties acting in their own best 
interest, desiring to obtain a more favorable outcome. Consequently, the outcome may be 
the sub-optimal trade-off between individual agencies' interests strongly influenced by 
bureaucratic power. 
WRC 605 and 606 Technical Work Coordination 
Unfortunately, the technical work surrounding WRC 2000 resolutions 605 and 
606 is among the minority of issues where a mutually agreeable result is not easily 
obtained. With conflicting interests, agencies may consistently disagree about the 
methodology used in a study, the conclusions to be drawn from an analysis, and many 
other aspects of technical work. Agencies would disagree because certain 
methodologies, technical definitions, and conclusions would change their ability to 
protect their agency's interests presently or in the future. 
Such is the case with technical work surrounding WRC Resolutions 605 and 
606. The table below summarizes the interests of the various parties. The main players 
in the 605 and 606 issues are the Air Force and the FAA. The other parties listed also 
play a role, but are not extensively involved. 
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Table 5: Agency Perspectives 
Agency Position / Perspective Reference 
FAA • Brings awareness of ICAO's perspective to IT AC 
process 
• Protect aviation systems 
• DME's have priority over GPS as a "safety of life" 
application 






AF/GPS (JPO) • Protect GPS system against adverse regulation, i.e. 
PFD limits and "excessive" international oversight. 
• GPS modernization and future applications will 
require more power. 
• Testing and analysis has not shown any need for PFD 
for resolution 606 and developed coordination 
mechanisms for resolution 605 to satisfy both RNSS 





AFFMA • Must represent all Air Force spectrum interests 
• Need to stay on amicable relations with other D.C. 







NTIA • NTIA does not have the resources to get involved in 
interagency disputes related to WRC resolutions 605 
&606. 
• NTIA has not played as active a role in these (WRC 
605 & 606) issues as they could have. 




The above table illustrates the diversity of perspectives the involved parties hold. 
These divergent and fairly noncompatible views between the Air Force and the FAA 
begin to show why coordination by consensus would be difficult between these parties. 
Furthermore, the perspectives of the other parties contribute to coordination difficulty. 
The unofficial perspective presented within NTIA explains why that agency has not taken 
an active role in the coordination. 
The perspective presented from AFFMA hints at a problem within the Air Force 
in presenting a consistent approach on these issues based on the different views of and 
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priority given to the same spectrum issue. ICAO's role further complicates the issue due 
to FAA's relationship with ICAO, and ICAO's relationship with the international 
aviation community. 
The specific problem exists between the GPS spectrum interests and the FAA's 
concerns regarding Distance Measuring Equipment (DMEs). The FAA uses DMEs (JPO 
Spectrum Engineer), and as a result, the FAA has a reason to support interpretations 
favorable to DMEs when coordinating issues related to WRC resolutions 605 and 606. 
The JPO desires unrestrained use of RNSS spectrum for the reasons outlined above. 
The Global Positioning System Joint Program Office and FAA have conflicted on 
the nature of U.S. technical papers and positions submitted to the ITU regarding these 
matters (JPO Spectrum Engineer; FAA Spectrum Engineer; Spectrum Consultant 
Expert). The FAA has opposed the JPO authored papers within U.S. Working Party 8D. 
The language in the papers has been diluted to achieve consensus, usually weakening the 
asserted position (JPO Spectrum Engineer). 
The difficulty in presenting papers stems from two issues coordinated in ITAC-R, 
especially Working Party 8D.   "[T]he FAA's goal is to approve Satnav [GPS] as the only 
radionavigation system required to be installed in an aircraft to support operations 
anywhere in the NAS [National Air Space]" (Department of Defense and Department of 
Transportation, 2000: 3-27). However, the FAA also currently operates and will continue 
to operate DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) for backup aircraft navigation 
(Department of Defense and Department of Transportation, 2000: 3-27). The PFD limits 
sought by the Europeans were based upon the theory that GPS signals would interfere 
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with radars / DMEs (Schoettler, 2000: 51), and the ongoing discussions center around 
this interference issue. 
Both the FAA and JPO have expressed the continual difficulty and aggravation 
surrounding these issues. Some FAA employees involved in working these issues have 
expressed that it has been very difficult to reach agreement. They have expressed that the 
issues have been confrontational between the agencies (FAA Spectrum Manager), that 
there is no arbiter of the preparatory process, that it is get consensus or do not go, and that 
no one is looking out for what is best for the U.S. as a whole (FAA Spectrum Manager). 
Employees at the JPO have expressed similar views or concurred with these opinions 
(JPO Spectrum Manager). 
These divergent interests between the FAA and JPO surrounding WRC 
resolutions 605 and 606 make consensus-based coordination problematic. The FAA has 
pursued a strategy in line with their interests, which is to advocate measures that would 
benefit their DME's systems (FAA Spectrum Manager). However, this strategy is in 
direct conflict with the GPS JPO interests. The NTIA has not provided overall guidance 
or leadership in resolving these issues, but instead has played a facilitator role 
encouraging the parties to achieve consensus (NTIA Spectrum Manager; FAA Spectrum 
Manager; JPO Spectrum Manager). The ITAC-R national committee could provide the 
leadership necessary to resolve conflicts. However, they generally act only as facilitators 
(AFFMA Technical Manager; JPO Spectrum Manager). 
As a result, the current approach is to fight out the issue bureaucratically or give 
in to compromise when the other party is successful in blocking your action (NTIA 
Spectrum Manager; FAA Spectrum Manager; JPO Spectrum Manager). Agency 
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representatives have raised issues to higher levels within their department when 
consensus cannot be reached. 
This situation has a striking similarity to observations made in a 1991 
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment report. This report stated that with no 
clear leadership, the process "depends on the power of individual personalities and the 
personalities among major players" (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 
1991: 101). The goal of the process is to reflect the best interests of the U.S. government, 
not to be unduly influenced by the power of individual players. As a result of this 
system, some submissions and alterations to technical contributions are more influenced 
by agency interests than focused upon supporting the existing U.S. position. 
Subsequently, the technical submissions may not support the existing position as strongly 
as they could. 
Other Factors Affecting Coordination 
Several other factors make coordinating these issues exceptionally difficult. 
These factors include interaction distances, interconnectedness, and role ambiguity. 
Interaction distances refers to the effort required to coordinate (Rathnam et. ah, 1995; 
Torrens 1969; Gardner and Snipe 1970; Hooyman, 1976; qtd. in Rogers, 1982), 
interconnectedness refers to the degree of interrelationships between the tasks (Rathnam 
et. ah, 1995), and role ambiguity refers to the degree to which individuals represent 
multiple interests (Baker and O'Brien 1971; Ahmed and Young 1974; qtd. in Rogers, 
1982: 66; Rathnam 1995: 1904-1905). 
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The interaction distances are high due to the geographic separation of the FAA 
and JPO, as well as other agencies. The FAA spectrum office is located in Washington, 
D.C., and the GPS Joint Program Office is located in Los Angeles, CA, three time zones 
apart. Face-to-face meetings and discussions require a lengthy flight across the country. 
Conference calls and teleconferences face the difficulty of a three-hour time difference. 
The program office can attend many meetings in Washington D.C., but finds it extremely 
difficult to maintain an active presence. The other co-located Washington, D.C. agencies 
should find it easier to meet and reach agreements that do not include the JPO's 
considerations. The JPO and GPS interests should, however, have a presence in D.C. 
through the Air Force Frequency Management Agency. 
Role ambiguity plays a minor role in the process; however, several instances of 
role ambiguity are pertinent. First, the FAA works closely with ICAO on an 
interpersonal level and is thereby influenced by ICAO to an uncertain degree (Spectrum 
Consultant Expert; NTIA Spectrum Manager). Thereby, ICAO may influence the FAA, 
bringing non-U.S. interests into the process. Secondly, AFFMA, as the JPO's 
representative in the D.C. area, has to represent numerous Air Force issues in addition to 
GPS, and is co-located with the other agencies. Subsequently, when negotiating one of 
many issues with the other agencies, AFFMA has to balance the interests of different 
systems (AFFMA Technical Director), may trade off one system's priority in 
negotiations for another, and as a result may not give the JPO as much support or priority 
as the JPO desires. 
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The high levels of interconnectedness are caused by the nature of the technical 
work being performed. The technical work often requires extensive coordination 
between the FAA and JPO. 
The primary difficulty in coordinating these issues stems from the use of an 
improper coordination mechanism—a consensus-based process. The use of a consensus- 
based process to coordinate directly conflicting issues by coequal process players results 
in interagency power struggles and solutions that may not reflect the national interests (as 
defined by the existing U.S. view or proposal). Coordination is complicated to a lesser 
degree by interaction distances, interconnectedness, and role ambiguity. Among these 
three (interaction distances, interconnectedness, and role ambiguity) interaction distances 
seems to have the largest impact due to the three-hour time difference and large 
geographic separation of the JPO and FAA. 
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V.      Conclusions And Recommendations 
As described previously, the ITAC process acts to integrate the many interests of 
U.S. agencies and private sector participants. Within this process, proposals or views and 
supporting technical documents are approved for international use. In many occasions, 
coordinating the interests of different parties or agencies simply means incorporating the 
various interests into the document. However, with certain issues, incorporating one 
agency's interests must come at the expense of another agency's interests. For these 
issues, a consensus-based process becomes a power struggle. Accordingly, an 
examination of resolution 605 and 606 issues in the ITAC process revealed several 
propositions regarding consensus-based coordination processes: 
Theoretical Conclusions 
The application of coordination theory to the interagency coordination process 
revealed several propositions: 
1. A consensus-based coordination process is adequate for: activities that share a 
common output, and that output is overlapping. A consensus-based process is 
suited to issues that do not directly conflict, and where a mutually agreeable 
result is negotiable. 
2. A consensus-based coordination process is not adequate for: activities that 
share a common output, and the tasks conflict. In this instance, a mutually 
agreeable result is not easily obtained. 
a.   When conflicting tasks are coordinated through a consensus-based 
interagency process, agency power struggles will ensue. 
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i.   The result of such a power struggle will be in line with the 
agency having the most authority, influence, or resources, 
b.   When tasks conflict, there needs to be a mechanism separate from the 
two coequal parties, such as an independent decision-maker, to decide 
what takes priority. 
Specific Conclusions concerning GPS spectrum / regulatory issues 
In addition to the theoretical aspects, this study sought to identify the situation- 
specific problem or problems in coordinating ITU contributions (especially technical 
papers) relevant to WRC resolutions 605 and 606 within the U.S. government. 
Defending and advancing U.S. interests at the ITU requires submitting the results of 
technical efforts in the form of technical contributions. The problem is that changes to 
technical contributions are allowed that are strongly influenced by interagency power 
struggles and thereby not necessarily consistent with or supporting of the existing U.S. 
position. Changes that are influenced by agency interests instead of supporting the 
existing U.S. position weaken the United States' ability to support its spectrum positions 
internationally. Increased involvement of leadership in approval process of technical 
contributions may mitigate this problem. 
The logic behind these specific findings is outlined below. First the premises or 
base assumptions are listed. The premises are followed by important findings of fact. 
The conclusions are determined from an analysis of the facts using coordination theory 
and the premise as the desired state or goal. 
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This study assumes the following premise: 
1.   Any technical contribution submitted internationally to the ITU should support 
the existing U.S. position. 
a. The term "U.S. position," as used above is defined to mean the existing 
U.S. view / proposal on the given issue. 
b. The term "technical contribution submitted internationally" refers to those 
technical contributions created within the U.S., and approved by the IT AC 
National Committee. 
This study makes the following findings of fact: 
1.   Changes to technical contributions are being made that are inconsistent with the 
existing U.S. view / proposal or simply weaken the argument. 
a.   One or more agencies are making these changes that are seen as favorable 
to their agency's interests; examples of these changes are a more favorable 
interference methodology or wording of a paper's findings. 
This study makes the following conclusions: 
1. There is insufficient oversight and enforcement to ensure any changes to technical 
submissions are consistent with the existing U.S. view / proposal or unnecessarily 
weaken the argument. 
2. Although an agency may disagree with the existing view or proposal for its own 
reasons, they must act as if in agreement with that policy in the technical approval 
process. 
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3.   The geographical separation between the GPS JPO and Washington D.C.-based 
Federal Agencies increases the effort required to coordinate. 
Suggested remedial actions: 
Below are suggested actions, along with their potential advantages and 
disadvantages. The suggested actions may be combined or used individually. 
Action: Have the NTIA assume a more aggressive leadership role to ensure all 
internationally submitted technical work and changes thereto are in strict compliance 
with the existing U.S. view or proposal. 
Advantages: The NTIA is already the principal Federal Government spectrum 
manager. Under a more proactive leadership role, the NTIA could influence the Federal 
Agencies, set overall spectrum goals, and ensure a cohesive effort. 
Disadvantages: The NTIA may need increases in budget and work force to 
assume a greater level of detail in the process. 
Action: Use the existing U.S. view or proposal on a given issue as a benchmark 
by which to settle disagreements between agencies and parties on input documents. 
Advantages: No structural changes to the process are required. Process 
participants will no longer feel compelled to compromise on issues and lengthy 
controversies and arguments could be avoided. 
Disadvantages: This approach gives additional weight to the existing U.S. view 
or proposal, and could cause difficulties in changing it if evidence becomes available to 
necessitate that. 
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Action: Create a GPS-JPO field office in the Washington D.C. area directly 
under the control of the Joint Program Office. 
Advantages: The JPO will have a greater attendance at the frequent spectrum- 
related meetings that occur in the D.C. area, and the JPO representatives can develop 
personal relationships with other agencies' D.C. based employees. The personal 
relationships will facilitate teamwork and communication, and the geographical location 
of the individuals will reduce the effort required to attend meetings. 
Disadvantages: The most obvious drawback is the additional expense. 
Additionally, unless actions are taken to reinforce the connection of the D.C. based office 
with that in Los Angeles, the goals and vision of the geographically separated offices 
may drift apart. 
Limitations of Findings 
This research focused on the technical contributions created and submitted in 
response to WRC 2000 resolutions 605 and 606. While the conclusions of this study 
should be applicable to this specific example, there may be other factors that prevent the 
conclusions from being generalized to the process as a whole. Additionally, while the 
views of many different agencies and experts were incorporated in the study, other 
pertinent perspectives may not have been considered. 
Future Research Topics 
1. The IGEB charter states that, among other responsibilities, it exists to "approve 
management issues that affect dual-use" and "resolve interdepartmental issues" 
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(Department of Defense and Department of Transportation IGEB Charter; JPO Spectrum 
Manager). Assess the IGEB's ability to perform these functions. 
2. Assess the individual government agencies' buy-in to the IGEB, their 
willingness to resolve disputes there, and willingness to accept the decisions. 
3. The Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements exists to generate civil 
requirements for the Global Positioning System. Coordination is required to integrate the 
civil and military, obtain funding, and make trade-off decisions. Ineffective coordination 
can result in unmet or unstated requirements. Preliminary indications show insufficient 
performance accountability between the IFOR and civil requirement process. Assess the 
effectiveness of the IFOR process. 
4. Identify the factors that make coordinating a multi-agency program difficult. 
Suggested case studies include NPOESS (National Polar Orbiting Environmental 
Satellite System), the Global Positioning System, and the newly created Homeland 
Security Office. 
56 
Appendix A: Acronyms 
AFFMA Air Force Frequency Management Agency 
ARNS Aeronautical Radionavigation System 
CITEL Inter-American Telecommunication Commission 
CPM World Radio Conference Preparatory Meeting 
DME Distance Measuring Equipment 
DoD Department of Defense 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FCC Federal Communications Commission 
GPS Global Positioning System 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IGEB Interagency GPS Executive Board 
IGEB-WG3      Interagency GPS Executive Board Working Group 3 
IT AC International Telecommunications Advisory Committee 
IRAC Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee 
ITU International Telecommunications Union 
IWG Interim Working Group 
JPO (The Global Positioning System's) Joint Program Office 
NAS National Air Space 
NASA National Air and Space Administration 
NTIA National Telecommunications and Information Administration 
OTA U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment 
PFD Power Flux Density 
PV Preliminary View 
RCS Radio Conference Subcommittee 
RNSS Radio Navigation Satellite Systems 
SG Study Group 
WAC World Radio Conference Advisory Committee 
WP U.S. Working Party 
WP8B U.S. Working Party 8B 
WP8D U.S. Working Party 8D 
WRC World Radio Conference 
WRC 2000      World Radio Conference held in the year 2000 
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Appendix B: Interview Guide for Preliminary Interviews1: 
Hello Sir/Ma'am: 
I am researching interagency coordination between the DoD component of the Global Position System and 
the Civil agencies. I am looking for specific examples of activities that require interagency coordination, 
how these processes function, and the problems or successes inherent in these processes. 
Use one of these approaches, depending on the particulars of the example given (if the example involves 
coordination mechanisms, use the activity focused approach; if the mechanisms are not obvious, use the 
dependency-focused approach) 
Dependency-Focused analysis: Identify dependencies, then search for coordination mechanisms.   In other words, look for 
dependencies, then ask which activities manage those dependencies. Failure to find such activities might suggest potentially 
problematic unmanaged dependencies. 
In dependency-focused analysis, we examine the activities and the resources they use, determine possible dependencies by 
considering which resources are used by more than one activity and then look for other activities within the process that manage 
these dependencies. More specifically, to identify dependencies and mechanisms, we ask questions such as the following about 
each activity in turn: 
■What are the inputs to this activity (physical, informational, and other preconditions such as permissions? Are there flow 
dependency with the activities that create these resources? Are these resources used by other activities, creating shared resource 
dependencies? 
■What are the outputs? Is there a flow dependency with the activities that use these resources? Do multiple activities 
create these resources, creating common output dependencies? 
'What other resources are used, e.g., actors, resources, or other items of importance in the process? Are there shared 
resource dependencies with these resources? How are these resources assigned to this activity? 
Activity-focused analysis: Identify coordination mechanisms, then search for dependencies. In other words, identify activities 
in the process that appear to be coordination activities, then ask what dependencies those activities manage. This approach asks if the 
coordination activities are necessary or effective. 
Two main heuristics:  1) Search directly for coordination activities. Identify tasks and see what they coordinate. Identify 
shortcomings in the coordination activity. 2) Identify individuals that coordinate. Identify what they coordinate, and how the 
coordination takes place. 
Possibilities for areas to examine: 
Specifications that multiple agencies rely upon 
Documents that multiple agencies rely upon 
Requirements involving more than one agency 
1 This guide was used to gather preliminary information about a process and determine if the process was a 
good candidate for analysis. 
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Appendix C: Preliminary Process Identification 
Processes analysis working sheet: 
Process "Name" Dysfunction, Importance, 
Feasibility (High, 
Medium, Low) Notes and Characteristics 
Spectrum Management H 
H 
H 
The GPS program complies with international electromagnetic frequency allocations. As a 
result, the program must represent its interests in a domestic and international setting. 
The GPS spectrum management process operates through several organizations including 
the U.S. Working Party Process, the IGEB, International Telecommunications Union, 
CITEL, and The International Civil Aviation Organization, and others. These 
organizations work to coordinate the multitude of positions within the U.S. Government, 
regions, and the world. 







The L5 Specification is given to a contractor, (in this case ARINC) to write the Interface 
Control Document -> document then undergoes a JPO internal review -> the document is 
send to the DoT for review, and an iterative process with the DoD to come to a consensus 
on the document's contents. 






Drafting and publishing these specifications involves a multitude of organizations (and 
their sub-organizations), including the DoT, DoD, FAA, RTCA, and others. Pay attention 
to mismatches in documents and performance parameters. 





FAA affiliated Stanford professor working on WAAS determined need to conduct a test on 
GPS satellite. Test had to be coordinated across multiple agencies, including 2nd Space 
Operations Squadron (AF), JPO, and FAA/DOT. No individual owned process or had 
responsibility for overall process. NOTE: Test did not take place due to unrelated reasons. 
Non-routine issue, test 





2nd Space Operations Squadron, OO-ALC-LH (Hill AFB Radar Squadron) 124 & 117, also 
coordinated with the FAA; FAA did not approve, and Air Force researched legal 
ramifications and indicated to FAA that it was not part of the process. FAA agrees. 
Coordination was accomplished along mainly informal modes. 






The Interagency Forum for Operational Requirements exists to generate civil requirements 
for the Global Positioning System. Coordination is required to integrate the civil and DoD 
requirements, fund, and make trade-off decisions. Ineffective coordination can result in 
unmet or unstated requirements. Preliminary indications show insufficient performance 
accountability between the IFOR and civil requirement process. 





The IGEB operates to coordinate many interagency aspects of GPS. Investigation could 
asses this effectiveness. Preliminary indications indicate problems with a consensus 
decision-making format. 
Note: this table is the result of only a preliminary investigation; the descriptions are not developed, and 
the list is not exhaustive. This is only provided to illustrate some of the processes. 
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